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Abstract
Public sector commissioning has risen rapidly to prominence as the central mechanism
for the ‘purchase’ of services in an increasingly mixed economy of public services in the
UK and this has wide-ranging consequences for non-state actors including those in the
third sector. Academic consideration of commissioning has been rather fragmented,
concerned with particular service fields or sectors. This paper provides an overview,
with a focus on the relationship between the state and the third sector. The paper
begins by questioning whether commissioning is really ‘new’ or a continuation of exist-
ing trends around procurement and contracting and whether it constitutes a genuinely
transformative relationship between the state and third sector. It considers some core
debates about the likely impact of commissioning on the third sector and its relationship
with the state. In doing so, the paper advances two main arguments: that commissioning
remains highly fragmented in policy and practice, between different localities and scales
of government; and that there is a tension within commissioning policy between the
‘rhetoric’ of the ‘full cycle’ approach based on needs assessment and planning, and what
appears to be an emerging reality of resource-constrained, large-scale and Payment by
Results-based contracting. These raise real concerns for organizational and service
quality outcomes.
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Introduction
The concept and discourse of commissioning has grown rapidly in prominence in
UK public policy and public services in recent years, with particular resonance in
discussions about the state’s engagement of third sector and other non-state actors
delivering in an increasingly mixed economy of public services (Dominey, 2012;
Murray, 2011). Commissioning is not a sudden innovation nor arguably a passing
policy fad, but rather is consistent with wider international and historical trends
towards the diversiﬁcation of providers within public services, and dissatisfaction
with existing contracting models (especially in relation to state–third sector organ-
ization (TSO) relationships). In an international context, the term ‘commissioning’
is rarely used and would be considered to be part of processes of externalization,
contracting out or privatization (Ramia and Carney, 2005). But the prominence
given to commissioning has an important national UK dimension and is closely
linked to a number of active debates, especially the rise of interest in ‘technologies’
that are concerned to specify and reward particular outcomes, in particular
Payment by Results (PbR), commissioning for outcomes and the related ideas of
Social Impact Bonds and social return on investment (Sturgess et al., 2011).
These developments have in turn been driven by doubt over the ability of states
to bear the costs of welfare spending and particularly to control and reduce
demand in the context of ﬁscal stresses on public spending (Bartlett, 2009). In
the UK, it has been given particular prominence by the arrival of the 2010
Coalition Government which has stated its intention to make commissioning,
rather than the improvement and indeed expansion in funding of public sector
delivery, the focus for reform and reshaping of a wide part of the landscape of
public services. Principally in its Open Public Services White Paper, it set out a core
emphasis on commissioning at the heart of public service strategy, diversiﬁcation
and ‘personalization’ and greater use of PbR systems and outcomes-based com-
missioning (HM Government, 2011).
However, it is important to not be seduced by the apparent novelty of these
approaches, and a central aim of this paper is to question the extent to which
commissioning is really new by contextualizing it in the recent development of
approaches to the ‘purchasing’ of services by the state. For instance, ‘commission-
ing’ may simply be a new name for what is actually the continuance of relatively
unchanged forms of contracting with non-state actors. Secondly, and relatedly, the
paper questions the extent to which commissioning represents an attempt to fash-
ion a genuinely new relationship between the state and non-state actors that might
transform the long-term nature of public services. And thirdly, it begins to consider
what it might mean for the third sector in particular, by examining a set of debates
about whether it will be adversely or positively aﬀected. One of the themes running
through the paper is that commissioning is a diﬃcult topic to get to grips with
because it is still in development in theory and in practice, is dispersed across the
public service landscape and operates at diﬀerent scales between the national and
local. It also diﬀers in how well embedded it is in diﬀerent policy ﬁelds, and there is
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little sense of common approach, shared professional standards or best practice
across the public sector. The paper identiﬁes a tension running through public
policy around commissioning between the ‘rhetoric’ of the ‘full cycle’ approach
based on needs assessment and planning, and what appears to be an emerging
reality of resource-constrained, large-scale and PbR-based contracting which per-
haps borrows some of the language of commissioning to gain legitimacy. All of
these themes are likely to have considerable salience in public policy debates.
The paper ﬁrst addresses the ‘what’ question by outlining how commissioning is
deﬁned and discusses some normative debates that have taken place about what
commissioning should be. It then covers ﬁrst, the emerging policy context for
commissioning in the UK including its rapid rise in the last decade; and secondly,
some indications to how policy is being taken up around the country and between
diﬀerent public agencies. This is an under-researched area and much remains to be
explored. The third section looks at what is known about the way commissioning is
developing in practice including key barriers and problems that have been identi-
ﬁed in the academic and policy debate about the role of the third sector in com-
missioned services. Finally, the conclusion picks up on the central tension raised
above and includes some consideration of the key challenges for research in rela-
tion to commissioning.
What is public sector commissioning in the UK and where did
it come from?
The arrival of commissioning must be situated in the historical context of the
widespread adoption of New Public Management (NPM)-inspired reforms from
the 1980s onwards that led initially to an emphasis on the contracting out of ser-
vices through the Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) regime (Entwistle
and Martin, 2005). Criticisms and indeed outright opposition to this led to a
softening of the stance towards contracting out and a greater emphasis on part-
nership and collaborative procurement approaches, expressed in particular through
the adoption of the Best Value regime, Public-Private Partnerships and the Public
Finance Initiative. There was also a parallel rise in the 1990s of a more general
partnership discourse in relation to third sector involvement in public service deliv-
ery, expressed most clearly in the state–voluntary sector Compact (Bovaird and
Downe, 2006; Carmel and Harlock, 2008; Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Lewis,
2005). The general shift underlying this was of state withdrawal from direct pro-
vision, expressed perhaps most concisely in Osborne and Gaebler’s (1993) prescrip-
tion that governments should steer, but not row – and commissioning is consistent
with this principle. Turning more speciﬁcally to commissioning, a useful and oft-
referenced deﬁnition is that of the Cabinet Oﬃce (2006: 5) who deﬁne it as ‘the
cycle of assessing the needs of people in an area, designing and then securing an
appropriate service’ (see also Dominey, 2012; Kimantas and Dawson, 2008). This
deﬁnition resurfaced in the Coalition Government’s Green Paper on
Commissioning (Cabinet Oﬃce, 2010: 7), although the word ‘outcomes’
Rees 47
 at Open University Library on March 9, 2016ppa.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
was used instead of ‘service’. The imagery of a commissioning ‘cycle’ has had
longstanding resonance, and as Bovaird et al. (2012) found the widespread adop-
tion of commissioning across Government involved acceptance of the basic cycle
model, although there was considerable variation in the speciﬁc emphasis accorded
to parts of the cycle between diﬀerent departments. Indeed, the Cabinet Oﬃce has
even presented commissioning in an even more stripped down version as ‘under-
stand-plan-do-review’ (see Figure 1(b) for a similar scheme). Moreover, one of the
consistent stresses within the commissioning policy debate has been the distinction
with ‘procurement’ (Martikke and Moxham, 2010; Tanner, 2007). As Macmillan
puts it:
Procurement is the range of processes involved in purchasing goods and services from
provider organizations, in whatever sector. Commissioning is a broader set of service
delivery processes which involve consultation, needs assessment and service planning
and design. If procurement is about shopping, commissioning is about deciding what
to buy and how. (2010: 9)
Although commissioning at the level of ideal type or model appears to have
become a matter of consensus and is widely known, a persistent feeling to date
is that the model rarely if ever matches reality and that even where a tendering
process has been labeled as ‘commissioning’ what is actually occurring is in fact
‘procurement’ (Packwood, 2007). From a third sector perspective, there has typic-
ally been a range of complaints that TSOs have not been involved in the full cycle,
particularly service speciﬁcation/re-design (see Figure 1; Martikke and Moxham,
2010).
Figure 1. The commissioning cycle model.
Source: Reproduced with permission from (a) Institute of Purchasing Care, cited in Bovaird et al.
(2012) and (b) NAVCA and Reshenia Consulting (2010).
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As Bovaird and Davies (2011) point out, commissioning in the ‘old’ public
administration was originally more akin to a straightforward procurement or pur-
chase decision; whereas the ‘ﬁrst wave’ of modern commissioning was associated
with the introduction of CCT in the 1980s which embedded the ‘purchaser–
provider’ split as an enduring aspect of public service reform and which was
always a key tenet of the NPM more generally. Bovaird and Davies identiﬁed
the ‘second wave’ as a shift to ‘strategic commissioning’ associated with the
Every Child Matters White Paper and the development of a strategic commission-
ing framework for the Children’s Act (2004). From this point, the concept of
strategic commissioning rapidly spread across government particularly in those
departments concerned with personal services, and the language of commissioning
has come to dominate political and practice discourse.
Viewed as a policy agenda, commissioning can be interpreted as a top-down
policy driver attempting to fundamentally recast how public services should be
delivered, albeit one which has ﬁltered quickly out and down with much less resist-
ance than for instance CCT (see Bovaird and Downe, 2006, for a historical com-
parison). But despite the apparently widespread inﬂuence of commissioning, in the
UK there is a complex and multi-tiered aspect to service delivery due to a balance
of responsibilities between central government, local government and Executive
Agencies of government, who themselves have often been organized on regional
lines. Thus, bearing in mind that Bovaird et al. (2012) found considerable diversity
in understandings of commissioning within central government, the picture as
policy diﬀuses further is likely to be even more confused. And needless to say,
diversity in policy is likely to be followed in short order by diversity in implemen-
tation and in practice. For the third sector (and in addition private and other public
agencies) who might want to provide commissioned services, the picture of who is
commissioning services, is likely to be an intricate one.
Generally the concept of strategic commissioning appears to have emerged as
the dominant discourse, consistent with the broad NPM principle of the purchaser–
provider split and the ‘enabling state’, implying that the state continues to step
back from direct delivery. However, there has been unhelpful confusion as to
whether delivery is part of, or quite separate from commissioning. The Labour
era central government policy documents reviewed by Bovaird et al. (2012) are
inconsistent: some explicitly separate ‘commissioning’ from ‘providing’ while
others state that delivery is part of the commissioning cycle. Arguably more
important though is that a number of additional agendas have been loaded onto
commissioning, including the New Labour government’s stress on inter-agency and
cross-sector partnership working, the aspiration to better involve citizens in design
of services including the rise of interest in personalization (Lewis, 2005; Needham,
2010), and the growing interest in commissioning for outcomes rather than outputs
(Bovaird and Davies, 2011; Sturgess et al., 2011). When it comes to the third sector,
the Labour government acknowledged that it might deserve special consideration
in policy. The Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) (2006)
proposed government adopt ‘intelligent’ commissioning meaning that the sector
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could expect sustainable and longer term funding with a level playing ﬁeld with the
private sector and a framework that could allow innovation to ﬂourish. Similarly,
the Oﬃce for the Third Sector (2006) advocated ‘commissioning principles’ that
essentially posited a framework that involved a strategic focus on outcomes, a
diversity of providers and the involvement of service users and providers in the
full cycle. Third sector-based reports have advocated improved commissioning
processes in speciﬁc service ﬁelds such as welfare to work that take better account
of the third sector’s contribution (and might result in more commissioning from the
sector) (Third Sector Task Force, 2009). NAVCA (2010) favours the idea of intel-
ligent commissioning, describing it as practices that enable good outcomes for
people, that are value for money, and that enable genuine collaboration between
commissioners, the voluntary sector and service users.
One of the legacies of this earlier policy development has been confusion in
practice over the core meaning of commissioning. Although there has been more
experience of commissioning in the health and social care policy arenas, Checkland
et al. (2012: 540) were still moved to comment that ‘we also found that both com-
missioners and providers struggled with the more fundamental ideas underpinning
commissioning’, suggesting that shared understanding is far from the norm. In the
health ﬁeld in particular, further uncertainty is caused by the potentially profound
institutional upheaval caused by a combination of funding reductions and the
structural reform of the National Health Service (Dickinson and Miller, 2011).
Colloquially it is very likely to mean ‘being purchased to provide a service’, but
this muddies the waters with procurement. Commissioning proper should mean
‘where the cycle operates in full’ but where the reality falls short or is circumvented
in some way – is the implication that the term should not be used? Commissioning
might be intrinsically unstable in its meaning, and seeking a consensual deﬁnition
could be doomed to failure. There is also a potential conﬂict – particularly in local
government, and especially now that deep budget reductions are being made –
between commissioning as something that is about securing cost savings and driv-
ing outsourcing, and where commissioning is more a description of something
more collaborative, trust-based and networked and about participative planning
for social outcomes. It may be useful to view commissioning as operating on a
continuum – between ‘intelligent/collaborative’ commissioning on one side and
‘commissioning on price/procurement’ on the other.
Public sector commissioning in the Coalition era: Is there
a coherent picture?
The 2010 Coalition Agreement not only set out the Government’s overriding pri-
ority to reduce the structural deﬁcit in one parliament but also embarked on a
social agenda under the banner of ‘Big Society’ – essentially a rebalancing of the
responsibilities of state, civil society and individuals (Alcock, 2012; Taylor-Gooby
and Stoker, 2011). It was relentlessly criticized for its vagueness, the perception that
it was merely cover for an eﬀort to shrink the state, and a lack of clarity about how
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it might be achieved. Nevertheless, the ‘Big Society’ was cautiously welcomed by
third sector representative bodies and those organizations that might have expected
an enhanced role in public services, or else welcomed the opportunity for less
‘targetry’ or centralized bureaucracy. The Coalition’s Green Paper on
Modernising Commissioning (Cabinet Oﬃce, 2010) was in the spirit of the Big
Society and set out aims to devolve commissioning where possible and promote
greater diversity in order to ‘drive eﬃciency, eﬀectiveness and innovation in public
services by opening more public service areas to civil society organizations’ (p. 9);
though also to make wider use of PbR. The subsequent Open Public Services White
Paper (HM Government, 2011) had a stronger, more ideological steer which con-
tinued the emphasis on commissioning as a mechanism, as well as achieving decen-
tralization as an aim. Two further key principles – choice and diversity of provision
– deﬁne the general context for the organization and delivery of services that in
contrast to the ‘old centralized approach’ is marked by a ‘range of providers
competing to oﬀer a better service’ (pp. 7–9). Another two principles relate more
to governance and values: ensuring both fairness of access and accountability,
particularly in terms of democratic accountability. The Paper also recognized the
relevance of scale, grouping public services into those commissioned at the indi-
vidual, neighbourhood and national level. At the same time, the wider policy pic-
ture, particularly in relation to the controversial Health and Social Care Bill, has
been widely interpreted as about opening up public services to greater competition,
particularly from the private sector in the context of an ideological shrinking of the
scale and scope of the state (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011). The alliance of the
deﬁcit reduction agenda with public sector ‘cuts’ has undoubtedly enhanced the
politicized nature of the debate about the future shape of public sector
commissioning.
The growing emphasis on commissioning for outcomes was a feature of both New
Labour and Coalition policy on commissioning. This approach is in distinction to
the detailed speciﬁcation of service content and activity levels and reﬂects a grow-
ing impatience with the limitations of traditional command and control, target
setting and related monitoring. The principal mechanism that is emerging is
PbR, in which contract payments are conditional on achievement of speciﬁed out-
comes – an approach that has become most established in employment services
(Rees et al., 2013). The White Paper clearly stated Government’s intention to
introduce PbR in a wide range of public services including criminal justice,
public health and drug and alcohol treatment. PbR is also an intrinsic part of
the Social Impact Bond approach that so far has been piloted in one prison,
aiming to reduce reoﬀending rates (Dominey, 2012). PbR therefore is distinct
from commissioning as a process; however, it seems that for many non-govern-
mental actors, PbR will become increasingly central to the experience of being
contracted by the state.
The development of commissioning as a key mechanism in the state–third sector
funding relationship needs to be set within the wider picture of state funding and in
particular the longer term trend towards the use of contracts rather than grants for
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funding services through the third sector (Carmel and Harlock, 2008). The 1990s
saw a sustained increase in public funds ﬂowing to the sector, continuing into the
ﬁrst decade of the 21st century. Public funding rose rapidly from £8.4bn in 2000/
2001 to £12.8bn in 2007/2008 and had reached £13.6bn by 2009/2010, the latest
date at which ﬁgures are available (Clarke et al., 2012). The second signiﬁcant part
of this story has been the steady shift in emphasis from grant to contract funding.
In 2009/2010, £3.1bn of the statutory funding was received as grants, down from
4.6bn in 2000/2001. Meanwhile, contract funding increased over the period from
£3.8bn to £10.5bn. Thirdly, funding to the third sector represents a small propor-
tion of overall Government purchases of goods and services – in 2009/2010 con-
tracted spending by central government was 5.3% of the total. However,
signiﬁcantly, the proportion, at 8.8%, is higher for local government (Clarke
et al., 2012). Finally, a minority of charities receive any state funding: in 2008,
36% of TSOs received any public income. Around 18% received income from local
sources, 5% from national sources and 14% from both (Cliﬀord et al., 2012). Little
is known, however, about how much of these ﬂows of funding are speciﬁcally
controlled through commissioning processes, and this is a major challenge for
understanding the wider signiﬁcance and development of commissioning.
National government policy and commissioning practice is likely therefore to be
one important, but far from the only determinant of the commissioning experience
for the third sector. As the ﬁgures above suggest, local government is the more
important part of the state from the third sector perspective. A recent survey found
that 81% of council leaders and chief executives expect their strategic commission-
ing role to increase in the near future. The same survey showed that 65% said that
more contracts would go to the VCS (White, 2011). However, as this report makes
clear, the actual diﬀusion and impact of these policies under discussion as far as
local policy and reality is far from certain – and the interaction of local government
with commissioning practice in other public services is also highly complex and
uncertain in a time when profound public service reforms are occurring (Miller,
2013). What we can suggest is that councils have reacted to the commissioning
agenda in diﬀerent ways, some with enthusiasm and some in a spirit of resistance
(Bovaird and Downe, 2006) – but that there is a lack of research evidence of
diﬀerent approaches taken by councils. Pro-commissioning councils can be identi-
ﬁed as those which have publicly proclaimed themselves as ‘commissioning coun-
cils’ or have adopted aspirational titles such as ‘Total Commissioning’ or brands
such as the ‘EasyJet’ council. Dissenting councils have adopted alternative broad
strategies such as co-operative or mutual (‘John Lewis’) council models. Some,
most notably Suﬀolk County Council, have been forced to row back from the
most radical models of outsourcing through commissioning following strong
local opposition. It can be argued that there is further group who have resisted
through inertia or withdrawal.
A clear message from this is the likelihood of very considerable divergence in
approach, particularly at a time when Government has lifted a range of national
regulatory practices (for example, Comprehensive Area Assessments and the
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abolition of the Audit Commission). However, it must also be stated that such
aspirations may not necessarily translate into support for the third sector – they
may facilitate, whether by design or not, a more general process of outsourcing that
may equally beneﬁt the private sector. On the other hand, there is also evidence
that local authorities ﬁnd contracting with the third sector more congenial and
have often been supportive of their local third sector, through inter alia the exist-
ence of designated oﬃcers to support the sector and third sector policies and
market support – and these individual elements may contribute to an improved
commissioning interface between the local government and the third sector
(Martikke and Moxham, 2010). There is also already very considerable divergence
of experience in diﬀerent service areas, particularly a much longer history of diver-
sity and commissioning in social care, resulting from the Community Care Act,
1992. As a result, nearly a third of UK public services that are delivered by charities
are in health and social care (Dickinson et al., 2012). In addition, there is uncer-
tainty about whether the new Public Services (Social Value) Act (2012) will have its
intended impact of making the commissioning of services from the third sector a
more level playing ﬁeld by ensuring that public authorities properly take into
account ‘economic, social and environmental well-being’ when awarding public
services contracts (Teasdale et al., 2012).
Towards commissioning in practice: What might
commissioning mean for the third sector?
A theme of recent literature on the commissioning of the third sector has been a
sense of ‘mutual incomprehension’ whereby public sector organizations lack aware-
ness of the services that TSOs can oﬀer as well as the limitations they face
(Martikke and Moxham, 2010); while TSOs lack awareness of the opportunities
available or how to engage more eﬀectively in commissioning processes, or are
simply under-prepared (Stevenson et al., 2010). Much research in recent years
has questioned the extent to which TSOs are ‘commissioning-ready’, that is,
geared up to winning contracts for services. In response, they have been exhorted
to become more ‘professional’ (Bubb and Michell, 2009), and invest in and dem-
onstrate skills and attributes such as the ability to work in partnership, maintain
strong relationships with the local community and service users; achieve targets
and outcomes; and to be ﬂexible and aware of new agendas (Packwood, 2007;
Tanner, 2007). Despite widespread recognition of ‘barriers’ in the New Labour
era, and direct investment and support for the sector through the National
Programme for Third Sector Commissioning (Audit Commission, 2007), concerns
about these issues appear to have endured (Hedley and Joy, 2012). The remainder
of the paper considers, in more detail, the most relevant issues for the third sector,
as expressed in both policy and academic debates. Some of these have signiﬁcant
continuities with longer running issues concerning the sector in recent decades,
others seem to be more connected to the speciﬁc policies and political juncture
created by the Coalition Government.
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Commissioning and competitive dynamics: Competition versus collaboration?
One of the main fears around the inﬂuence of public sector commissioning on the
third sector is its emphasis on competition, central to the introduction of quasi-
markets, and thus its role as a key driver of intensiﬁed competition between organ-
izations at a local level and between TSOs and organizations in other sectors. As
Buckingham found in the case of the Supporting People programme and home-
lessness charities in Southampton, England, the introduction of competitive ten-
dering enhanced competition between organizations, who increasingly viewed
kindred organizations as competitors for contracts, where previously there had
been a strong ethos of collaboration to provide eﬀective services for their clients
(Buckingham, 2009). The trust at the heart of good inter-organizational relation-
ships seemed to be a key victim: ‘competing for tenders was indeed undermining
trust and long-established relationships between VOs’ (Buckingham, 2009: 248).
However, in this account, it is not entirely clear that whether it is only the com-
missioning element driving competition, or equally a declining resource base; or
indeed whether providers to a degree just perceive their environment as more com-
petitive. Similar problems of perspective link to a further competitive dynamic of
concern to some in the sector: that through commissioning smaller and more local
organizations will be muscled out by large national charities, and thus the small
organizations and their embedded characteristics such as local knowledge and trust
will be lost to the service system (Milbourne, 2009).
Closely linked to this is the dynamic element to organizational change, with
many organizations under pressure to professionalize, bureaucratize and scale
up, raising a familiar set of fears about mission drift and isomorphism (discussed
in the next section).
Similarly, in the criminal justice ﬁeld commissioning is, haltingly, becoming a
reality; but is often viewed by public sector prison staﬀ as a threat, leading to
hostility towards TSOs (Mills et al., 2011). Commissioning is closely aligned with
the perception of an increasingly competitive environment: ‘Increased competition
between sectors to provide services has clearly started to aﬀect relationships and
partnership working on the ground’ (p. 200). Equally, the research suggested that
from a third sector perspective it was very unclear whether commissioning would
lead to increased opportunities, with TSOs expressing frustration at the unpredict-
ability of ‘constant policy change’ leaving them ‘fragile and nervous’ (p. 201).
Smaller, specialist organizations were viewed as particularly at risk, and thus the
diversity of the relevant ‘ecosystem’; and potential responses to this, including
entering into consortia or partnerships, can be time consuming and risky. The
rhetoric of commissioning emphasizes transparency, contestability and a fair play-
ing ﬁeld but many argue that this is far from the case in reality – in the case of
criminal justice there is a particularly strong perception that the private sector has a
competitive advantage. Yet in criminal justice, the public sector can have advan-
tages over TSOs because of their ‘monopoly’ over information and can block
information sharing, are less ﬁnancially stretched because they can’t go bankrupt
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and have the infrastructure already in place to deliver projects quickly (Mills et al.,
2011). On the other hand, TSOs seem to have some competitive advantages, like
experience of bidding and responding rapidly to opportunities. But all of this is
subsumed in an environment in which it is still very uncertain in terms of how
commissioning will actually play out in diﬀerent prisons and at diﬀerent scales,
particularly in relation to forthcoming reforms promising a ‘rehabilitation revolu-
tion’ in Probation services (Ministry of Justice, 2013).
Closely related here are arguments about professionalization – that is that
smaller organizations might be very valuable (by some metric such as trust with
communities or clients, or engagement with excluded groups) but are less able to
prove this in commissioning processes and do not have the capacity and profes-
sionalism to engage successfully in the commissioning cycle. However, the question
that needs to be asked is, are these eﬀects caused by commissioning per se, or by the
adoption of procurement, tendering exercises, or by contracting more generally. To
put it another way: is the strategic commissioning approach suﬃciently novel to be
the key driver of these enhanced competitive dynamics? Arguably, the dynamics of
commissioning-related competition are complex and it is likely to be analytically
diﬃcult to separate out the impacts that result directly from a strategic commis-
sioning approach and those more generic eﬀects arising from contracting with the
public sector.
The impact of commissioning on independence, mission
and organizational values
The justiﬁcation for the wider involvement of the third sector in public service
delivery has hinged on its supposed unique and distinctive qualities, in addition
to a (sometimes implicit) critique of public sector shortcomings (Bubb and Michell,
2009; Buckingham, 2009; Macmillan, 2010, 2013). A generic list of these advanta-
geous qualities would typically include ﬂexibility, ability to innovate, closeness to
and understanding of the needs of specialist client groups and the exhibition of an
ethos of care that might involve going well beyond the basic requirements of a
contract. Both New Labour Government and Coalition Government have shown
such continuity in extolling these virtues that there may be some suspicion that they
are attracted to TSOs as service providers as much because of the relatively high
level of public trust invested in them; and that perhaps, as Salamon (1995) put it,
the sector is surrounded by a ‘myth of pure virtue’. However, the UK Public
Accounts Select Committee was sceptical of the general claims made for the
sector, arguing that ‘[t]oo much of the discussion is still hypothetical or anecdotal.
Although we received a great volume of response to our call for evidence, much of
it admitted that the evidence was simply not available by which to judge the merits
of government policy’ (PASC, 2008: 3). This remains the case, though it is worth
pointing out the diﬃculty of establishing robust frameworks for assessing the rela-
tive strengths and performance of organizations from diﬀerent sectors when
delivering comparable services.
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Nevertheless, it remains the case that threats to these valued attributes have long
been a feature of discussions about public service delivery by the third sector,
including threats to independence as a result of contractual requirements and
monitoring, goal distortion and mission drift (Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Lewis,
2005). Few academic studies have mentioned commissioning explicitly but it is
clear that the same concerns apply. Bruce and Chew (2011) argue that competitive
pressures are increasing, a process they call marketization in which ‘VCOs are
adopting management approaches and values of the private (for-proﬁt) sector as
a means to respond to their changing environment, in particular to market-based
government policies’; which ‘risk[s] social mission drift, confused accountability
and erosion of charitable values’ (pp. 155–156). However, these concerns over
independence are certainly not new and echo the debate over the ‘contract culture’
in the 1990s, a debate which seems to resurface when the sector has perceived itself
to be under threat or enhanced pressure (Macmillan, 2010). Martikke and
Moxham (2010) found that not only a large majority of their respondents perceived
commissioning as a threat to their organizational independence as well as to their
reputation, but also many of the speciﬁc problems they experienced related as
much to the contracted nature of the service delivery as to the process of commis-
sioning more speciﬁcally.
It is diﬃcult at this early stage of commissioning to discern the likely impacts on
the third sector, but it is useful to think in terms of two dimensions: the vertical,
referring to the general policy context and overall relationship between the state
and third sector, and the horizontal, the more detailed practice and mechanics of
local commissioning and contracting. With regards to the ﬁrst, taken together the
policy around ‘any qualiﬁed provider’, the formal abandonment of the Compact,
the de-prioritizing of Oﬃce for Civil Society, and for instance, ministerial state-
ments about the experience of providers in the Work Programme, suggest that the
Coalition Government does not seek a partnership relationship with the sector in
which its attributes are ‘protected’ and fostered, but rather a ‘de-coupled’ and
market-based one (Alcock, 2010; Macmillan, 2013). Instead, TSOs might be
viewed by Government as easily substitutable delivery agents within service deliv-
ery systems. Further, the notion at the heart of the procurement phase of commis-
sioning that there should be transparent competition, means that TSOs might feel
the need to be increasingly professional, to scale up to build capacity (including
through consortia (Charity Commission, 2011)), and to enact cultural and organ-
izational value changes that are perceived to be problematic by some (McCabe,
2012). On the other hand, as noted, commissioning could be an opportunity for
many TSOs, and the implications of the Social Value Act may be beneﬁcial for the
sector also if a more level playing ﬁeld is achieved. A further more positive slant
may be that commissioning (as opposed to narrow competitive tendering and pro-
curement) may allow the development of more trusting and long-term relationships
between commissioners and providers, especially at the local level. The general
sense, however, is that because of public sector cuts and the decline of grant
giving, there has been a growth of pressures to ‘chase’ contracts through
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commissioning processes that increase the risk of mission drift, goal distortion and/
or bifurcation within some organizations. Finally, the pressure to demonstrate
impact and prove outcomes may again favour those who are more ‘professional’,
linking to the long-running fears about professionalization, scaling up/merging of
organizations and ‘Tescoisation’ (McCabe, 2012).
The second, horizontal, dimension relates to mechanisms, and in particular the
pressures associated with the rise of PbR and the Prime contractor model, as well
as potentially the increasing adoption of commissioning for outcomes. As
Buckingham (2009) notes, although the general concerns about state control are
not new, the actual mechanisms through which control is exerted can be quite
subtle and speciﬁc, and it may well be the exact processes that are changing. The
concept of isomorphism suggests that TSOs take on the structures and practices of
their (statutory) funders (Bovaird and Downe, 2006); while the governmentality
perspective tends to focus on technologies of control and self-regulation (Larner
and Butler, 2005). It is certainly possible that commissioning will involve these
processes and could intensify these trends, while accepting that diversity of practice
means considerable divergence of exact mechanisms – the actual eﬀects seem likely
to depend on the form of commissioning that is happening in practice. To take one
high-proﬁle example, in the Work Programme, a national UK welfare to work
scheme, the isomorphic pressures acting on TSO subcontractors may be quite
intense, deriving mainly from the pressure on all subcontractors, regardless of
sector, to deliver results under a very tight ﬁnancial regime. Given the dependence
of Prime contractors on their subcontractors delivering results, there are likely to
be very strict and intrusive performance management practices that ‘force’ organ-
izations to converge around similar approaches in terms of organizational strategy
and even the speciﬁc content of services. Pressure to deliver, and the ﬁnancial
consequences of failure, could easily see organizations subverting their mission,
or even ﬁnding themselves delivering outcomes that many other stakeholders in
society regard as socially undesirable. These issues are considered in more detail in
the next section.
The new commissioning landscape: ‘Prime’ contracting and PbR
At the heart of the new approach to commissioning promoted by the Coalition
Government appears to be an eﬀort to fundamentally reshape the way government
deals with providers of public services, including but not restricted to those from
the third sector. We can see this in the discussion of Open Public Services above:
the New Labour era concern to specify how commissioning is done, and the invo-
cation of partnership working has been de-prioritized in policy; instead, the elem-
ents of openness, any ‘qualiﬁed provider’, competition and especially the use of
PbR and outcomes have been strongly promoted. Moreover, this new ‘commis-
sioning landscape’ appears to be presaged on new ways to disperse risk away from
the state and therefore to manage and contain it; and as noted, it cannot be
divorced from the political context of deﬁcit reduction and public sector
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retrenchment. Therefore, it would be short-sighted to not consider the mechanisms
at the heart of the commissioning relationship and the impact they may have on the
sector.
To date, these issues have been particularly evident in the Work Programme –
representing in many ways the realization of Coalition policy for outsourced public
service on PbR lines. Closely linked has been the move to the Prime-subcontractor
model, which is based on the idea that the Prime has the scale, ﬁnancial capacity
and risk appetite to manage a very large PbR contract. Indeed, there is some
evidence that over time developments in the commissioning of welfare to work
have tended towards the increasing dominance of private sector organizations
and increasing reliance on scale (Rees et al., 2013). Thus, the functioning of the
Work Programme may presage future developments across a wide array of ‘open’
public services. The current contracting and ﬁnancing arrangements mean that:
(a) the resources available to provide services to jobseekers, and particularly the
likelihood of referring individuals to specialist providers, are extremely con-
strained; (b) perverse incentives remain endemic, arguably written into the welfare
to work model, and exacerbated by a low resource system, and not solved by the
attachment of variable fees to beneﬁt customer groups and (c) TSOs are inﬂuenced
by powerful isomorphic pressures, into working in similar ways, and delivering
similar interventions to organizations from the private sector in particular.
Finally, there have been widespread concerns that Primes ‘oﬄoad’ risk down
onto subcontractors, contradicting one of the key justiﬁcations for the Prime
model that Primes shield subcontractors from most of the risk inherent in PbR
systems (Hedley and Joy, 2012). These issues cast doubt on the ability of TSOs to
be a source of innovation and to continue to oﬀer the ‘comparative advantage’ that
it has long been argued they oﬀer (Cliﬀord et al., 2012). There is some evidence that
these regimes are viewed as being particularly problematic for the third sector. A
recent survey suggested that 55% of the TSOs surveyed believed that PbR would
have a negative eﬀect on ﬁnancial security and expressed scepticism that new
mechanisms would improve outcomes for beneﬁciaries – grants were viewed far
more favourably than PbR or tariﬀ-based contracts (Hedley and Joy, 2012).
Respondents also expressed a strong preference for being subcontracted by other
charities rather than by private sector organizations and believed that charities run
bidding processes in a much fairer way than either private organizations or public
commissioners.
The longer term impact on the service delivery ‘system’ is more speculative but
nevertheless important, given the third sector’s position in civil society and in
advocating on behalf of beneﬁciaries and citizens. The wider strategic concern is
that the new commissioning landscape might bring about a gradual disintegration
(and therefore diminution in the quality) of services, enhanced complexity and a
negative eﬀect on outcomes for individuals. As Milbourne (2009) pointed out, a
key rationale for the move to strategic commissioning was to move towards longer
term contracts that supported collaboration across service areas and sectors. Under
the previous government, she identiﬁed that major barriers include inﬂexibility in
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statutory organizations, competitive funding arrangements, diﬀerential power rela-
tions and lack of trust (Milbourne, 2009). It seems though that the Coalition ver-
sion of commissioning may intensify these interlinked aspects. The general
consequences of the increased competitive and risk environment might be reduced
trust, collaboration, real threats to smaller and less professional organizations and
hence a decline in diversity and the eﬀectiveness of the local ‘ecosystem’ of part-
nership. Meanwhile, competition that results in local TSOs losing out to nationals
and private sector organizations might mean an elimination of those organizations
that most embody distinctive characteristics of trust, innovation, responsiveness
and reach. These dynamic and diﬃcult to manage trade-oﬀs are central to the
demands on local authorities in particular to pay attention to their ‘market shap-
ing’ role. Unfortunately, little is really known about how well equipped public
sector organizations are to fulﬁll this task. Once again though, there is a clear
tension between a vision of ‘intelligent’ commissioning which includes market stew-
ardship and one which favours economies of scale, private sector supply chain
management practices and PbR.
Conclusion
This paper set out ﬁrstly to ask what if anything is new about commissioning as
distinct from well-established processes referred to variously as outsourcing, exter-
nalization, competitive tendering and public sector contracting. In common with
Painter (2013), surveying the wider public service reform agenda, it ﬁnds evidence
of both continuum and dichotomy between the New Labour and Coalition eras, as
well as the importance of commissioning as one ‘political narrative’. However, a
deeper and more uncertain issue is the shifting and much debated relationship
between the state and the third sector and the seeming impact this might have
on the latter (Carmel and Harlock, 2008; Lewis, 2005). In short, one interpretation
of commissioning is as an intensiﬁcation of existing trends in this relationship, with
increased emphasis on the market mechanism, competition and market-making. As
the review presented in this paper suggests, commissioning seems likely to raise
similar kinds of issues for TSOs, and by extension their clients and beneﬁciaries, as
these existing trends have. On the other hand, it would be short-sighted to suggest
that commissioning doesn’t at least have the potential to oﬀer – through the con-
sideration of social value for instance – a more open and collaborative approach
than the narrow procurement approach. It may even be an opportunity for the
third sector to gain an advantage, given the emphasis in commissioning on a whole
cycle approach that can value and bring in the sector’s strengths in needs analysis,
community and user engagement, and in demonstrating its ability to achieve social
outcomes and impact (Miller, 2013).
A common theme developed in this paper is that there is an ambiguity in
whether commissioning is driving a fundamental change in the form of the rela-
tionship between the state and the sector – what has been referred to here as the
vertical dimension. An empirical challenge is to consider whether the content of
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that relationship is really changing. But it will be important, though diﬃcult,
to also distinguish the horizontal dimension, which will be dominated by the
actual mechanisms at the heart of commissioning processes. For TSOs themselves,
it will likely be the ‘hard’ contracting elements that shape their experience of ‘being
commissioned’ much more signiﬁcantly than the policy or political rhetoric. In
particular, these are likely to involve a set of interlinked issues relating to the
mechanisms that are being employed in commissioned public services, most not-
ably the rise of PbR, other relatively novel forms of contracting, and intensifying
forms of risk dispersal. Although it is early days, taken together they raise concerns
about the longer term impacts on TSOs and by extension the sorts of services and
outcomes they seek to deliver, as well as their wider role in society. Essentially, the
focus should not only be on the new commissioning landscape and its organiza-
tional implications, to the exclusion of a consideration of the type of commissioned
services (in terms of quality, equity and sustainability) that result.
There are a number of key areas of uncertainty and concern for those parts of
the sector who do or wish to engage in commissioning processes. The ﬁrst is that it
is likely to be very unclear the extent to which commissioning represents a genuine
break with existing practice or the continuance of ‘business as usual’ under a new
guise. It is also very hard to establish, given the huge variance in policy and prac-
tice, between diﬀerent scales of government, and diﬀerent localities, any general
pattern and therefore policy message. This issue is complex – there is the sense in
which even if commissioning is the ‘name of the game’ in any given locality or
service area, it may be subverted by local political preference and tradition, or by
the strength of local ties and personal relationships. Additionally, even if commis-
sioning is pursued in ‘good faith’ and in the spirit of implementing the full com-
missioning cycle, the understandable pressures to procure services that are value for
money in an era of ‘austerity’ may lead to contracts going to the best-priced option,
which may often be providers from the private sector or large national charities
willing to ‘loss lead’ on individual contracts. Such a scenario may lead stakeholders
to believe that commissioning oﬀers nothing new and to become disillusioned with
it. In this context, the – still contested and subjective – notions of social value,
impact and outcomes (and how to measure them) become particularly relevant and
probably, politicized (McCabe, 2012).
Finally, given the rise of commissioning as a central theme of governance and
service delivery modernization, it is diﬃcult to unpack from a range of closely
related issues, many of which are of particular concern to TSOs. These have
been noted throughout the paper, and include the use of PbR, Prime contracting
and risk transfer/dumping, the general trend to market-based mechanisms, and the
role of the concept of social value, and they make it diﬃcult to assess whether
commissioning is the real issue at stake. All of these issues raise pressing concerns
for research, in terms of how such closely related processes can be unpacked in
practice. It would likely entail a local, speciﬁc and embedded approach, which
would make generalizations diﬃcult. Underlying all of this is a deeper question
about the political context and direction of travel, and the need for a picture that
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includes diﬀerent forms of public sector commissioning across service ﬁelds,
and alertness to temporal dynamics. Commissioning may be regarded as success-
ful for TSOs, and citizens, in some contexts, at some times. In signiﬁcant parts
of public services, one key trend may be the development of ‘commissioning’
based on long-term outcomes paid by results, with the large-scale Prime contrac-
tor model, in which the third sector plays a highly subservient and dependent
role. Finally, it will be diﬃcult to make these enquiries in a time of profound
and destabilizing change caused by public service restructuring and ﬁnancial
stringency.
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